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I. INTRODUCTION
Wholly without action on his part, "the bastard, like the prostitute,
thief and beggar, belongs to that motley crowd of disreputable social
types which society has generally resented, always endured."' Society's
endurance of the bastard has not been accompanied by magnanimity.
Though tolerating his existence, it granted him but a paucity of inherit-
ance and support rights under the common law,2 and it even made truth
a defense to the otherwise slanderous epithet "bastard."3
* Associate Editor, University of Miami Law Review; former Student Instructor for
Freshman Legal Research and Writing.
1. Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 Am. J. SOCIOLOGY 215 (1939).
2. At common law the bastard was filius nullius, son of no one. He could not inherit
from either of his natural parents. See Brewer v. Blougher, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 78 (1840);
Note, The Status of Illegitimates in New England, 38 B.U.L. REV. 299 (1958); Note, Ille-
gitimacy, 26 BROOKLYN L. REV. 45 (1959). For various reasons, the general rule is that
the mother has the superior right to the custody of her illegitimate child. Marshall v.
Reams, 32 Fla. 499, 14 So. 95 (1893); Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1507 (1927). In Florida, the
mother of an illegitimate child is the natural guardian of her child. FLA. STAT. § 744.13(1)
(1967). Also by statute, the child is only the heir of the mother. FLA. STAT. § 731.29 (1967).
See generally Adams, Nullius Filius, 6 U. TORONTO L.J. 361 (1946); Ayer, Legitimacy and
Marriage, 16 HAav. L. REv. 22 (1902).
Recently, the equal protection clause has been held to apply to social and economic
legislation which discriminates on the basis of legitimacy of birth. In Levy v. Louisiana, 36
U.S.L.W. 4458 (U.S. May 20, 1968), the Supreme Court stated that: "[Illegitimate children
are not 'nonpersons.' They are humans, live and have their being. They are clearly 'persons'
within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 4459. Though
Levy dealt only with a wrongful death statute, its import may be broader and may be
extended to inheritance rights as well.
3. An imputation of illegitimacy generally is libelous or slanderous. Harris v. Nashville
Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1914) (libelous per se); Walker v. Tucker, 220 Ky.
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The bastard retaliated. By dabbling in juvenile delinquency 4 or suc-
cumbing to neuroticisms,5 he ensured that many of his increasing 6 num-
ber would be provided for at society's expense.7  Though occasional
statutes ameliorated society's harsh treatment,8 he sought further recom-
363, 295 S.W. 138 (1927) (slanderous); Jerald v. Huston, 120 Kan. 3, 242 P. 472 (1926)
(slanderous per se) ; cf. Teare v. Plumbers Local 295, 98 So.2d 79 (Fla. 1957) ; Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Brautigam, 127 So.2d 718 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961). Contra, Bolton v.
Strawbridge, 156 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (not slanderous per se). If it appears that
the matter charged as libelous is true and published with good motives, truth constitutes a
defense. FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § 13; 33 AM. JuR. Libel and Slander § 320
(1941).
4. The risks of juvenile delinquency among illegitimate children are greater than those
among legitimate children. GILLEN, SOCIAL PATHOLOGY 298 (3d ed. 1946), cited in Comment,
49 IOWA L. REv. 1005, 1006, n.3 (1964).
5. An illegitimate child is more likely to be neurotic. Id. at 311.
6. The number of live inegitimate births increased from 89,500 in 1940 to 291,200 in
1965. The rate per 1000 live births increased from 7.1 to 23.4 in the same period, the greatest
increase occurring in the nonwhite population and in the 15 to 19 year old bracket of
mothers. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (1967).
7. Public agencies often are required to care for illegitimate children. Pinchbeck, Social
Attitudes to the Problem of Illegitimacy, 5 BRIT. J. SOCIOLOGY 309, 310 (1954).
8. An illegitimate child is the heir of his mother and also of the person who acknowl-
edges himself to be the father in writing, and he inherits in the same manner as if legitimate.
However, unless the parents intermarry, in which case the child is legitimate for all pur-
poses, the child does not inherit from his parents' lineal or collateral kindred. FLA. STAT. §
731.29. The child's estate passes to his mother or heirs at law. Id. Any informal writing is
sufficient for acknowledgement by the father. In re Horne's Estate, 149 Fla. 710, 7 So.2d 13
(1942) (letter to registrar of college); Wall v. Altobello, 49 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1950) (hotel
registration card). Although the statute allowing a bastard to inherit from his mother is in
derogation of the common law, the Supreme Court of Florida has indicated that its con-
struction will not be so strict as to defeat its laudable remedial purpose. Hadley v. City of
Tallahassee, 67 Fla. 436, 65 So. 545 (1914).
It is impossible to assess the full import of the application of the equal protection
clause to statutes discriminating on the basis of legitimacy of birth. Perhaps because there
is a legitimate legislative purpose in attempting to assess the propensity of an intestate to
leave his estate toward certain persons, the effect of this application of the equal protection
clause may not be felt in the area of descent and distribution. See Levy v. Louisiana, 36
U.S.L.W. 4458 (U.S. May 20, 1968) and Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 36
U.S.L.W. 4459 (U.S. May 20, 1968).
"Any unmarried woman" may institute bastardly proceedings to determine the paternity
of a bastard and to compel the father to contribute to its support. FLA. STAT. §§ 742.011-
742.10 (1967). These proceedings are primarily for the relief of the public's welfare support
and not for punishment. Flores v. State, 72 Fla. 302, 73 So. 234 (1916).
Florida has not been as progressive as some states in providing for the rights of illegiti-
mate children. Some states provide that a bastard has all the rights of a legitimate child.
See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956); ORE. REV. STAT. '§;§ 109.060 (1967),
111.231 (1957). Some states equate the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children, at
least for support purposes. See, e.g., CAL. Cir. CODE .§ 196a (West 1961). Some federal
legislation affects the rights of illegitimates. See Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegiti-
mate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1967) ; Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal
Statutes, 76 HARV. L. REV. 337 (1962). It has been suggested that further legislation is
necessary. See Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform
Act on Illegitimacy, 44 TExAs L. REv. 829 (1966). For an extensive analysis of existing
legislation, see Comment, Illegitimacy in Kansas, 14 KAN. L. REV. 473 (1966); Comment, 18
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 343 (1961). For an analysis of the rights of the father of an illegiti-
mate child, see Comment, 50 MNxN. L. REV. 1071 (1966); 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 738 (1966).
It would appear that in the area of support, the Levy and Glona decisions might have
an impact. It might be argued, however, that support, unlike wrongful death, has a reason-
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VoL. XXII
pense for his plight by suing his putative father in tort for the stigma of
his bastardy." As courts are wont to do, the action was dismissed.'"
The dismissal of the bastard's action, an inventive mutation of the
common law aptly termed an action for "wrongful life,"" was unusual.
Recognizing that the elements of a willful tort were presented by the
claim, the first court to consider the action reluctantly dismissed it on
the basis of public policy.'
2
This Comment will examine the propriety of judicial non-recogni-
tion of an action for wrongful life, concluding that the injurious conduct
of the parents of an illegitimate child is the omission to marry, rather
than the act of giving birth to the bastard. An action for wrongful life
will be examined from this analysis of the tortious conduct.
A. The Cases
The first case dealing with a wrongful life action was Zepeda v.
Zepeda.'3 In that case an adulterine bastard sued his father seeking dam-
ages "for the deprivation of his right to be a legitimate child, to have
a normal home, to have a legal father, to inherit from his paternal an-
cestors and for being stigmatized as a bastard.' 4 The court held that
neither a claim for damages for mental distress 5 nor for defamation',
was charged in the complaint. It further held that the illegitimate child
able relationship to legitimacy. Probably the effect of the decisions may be to equate the
rights of legitimate and illegitimate children for support rights, as has been accomplished
in the California statutes.
9. Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill.
App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
1O. Id.
11. This was the term applied by the first court to consider the asserted cause of
action, Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 259, 190 N.E.2d 849, 858 (1963), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 945 (1964). Primarily due to the broadness of the term, it has been criticized.
Williams v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 830, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953, 959 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Note, The
Infliction of Illegitimacy A New Tort?, 43 N.D.L. REv. 99, 102 n.16 (1966).
12. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 945 (1964). The same result obtained for essentially the same reason in the only other
case in which this precise cause of action was considered, Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So.2d 52
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
13. Id.
14. 41 III. App. 2d at 246, 190 N.E.2d at 851.
15. Id. at 254, 190 N.E.2d at 855:
The present complaint .. .does not charge mental distress. The nearest approach to
this is the allegation that 'His father has wilfully injured and wronged him .. .
in stigmatizing him as an adulterine bastard.' To some persons the shame of being
an adulterine bastard might cause as genuine and severe emotional distress as that
resulting from other serious provocation. However, in the absence of proper and
adequate averments, we must hold that the complaint states no cause of action for
this tort. If it did outline such an action, it would be an interesting speculation
whether a charge of mental distress and emotional suffering could be made and
sustained on behalf of an infant.
16. The court held that absent an allegation of publication to a third person and be-
cause truth might constitute a defense, no cause of action was charged. Id. at 254-55, 190
N.E.2d at 855-56; see also note 3 supra.
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could not maintain an action against his parents for lack of affection,
for failure to provide a pleasant home, for disrupting the family life,
nor for being responsible for a divorce which has broken up the home,
as to do so would be to give to illegitimate children rights superior to
those of legitimate children.1 7 Dismissing the claim for inheritance
rights by reference to the common law doctrine of filius nullius and
statutory provisions,I" the court characterized the claim as one for dam-
ages for the stigma attached to an illegitimate status; an action for
wrongful life. 19
It was the wrongful life claim which caused the Zepeda court the
most difficulty. The court characterized the conduct of the defendant as
"willful and, perhaps, criminal ... [and] tortious in its nature."20 It
found no difficulty in concluding that the plaintiff suffered damages as a
result of the defendant's conduct,2' and its characterization of the con-
duct as "tortious" indicated a willingness to impose a legal duty with
respect to the conduct. Yet the court concluded that the merits of the
claim were outweighed by the encouragement its recognition would give
to related but undesirable suits.22 The court's inability to distinguish the
claim from such related claims led it to the conclusion that the action
could be maintained only upon legislative authority.
In Pinkney v. Pinkney,23 a recent Florida case, a claim for damages
for wrongful life again was presented. The claim met with the same fate
as that in Zepeda. Citing Zepeda, the court refused to allow the action
to be maintained in the absence of express legislative authority.24
In Williams v. State25 an analogous claim was presented. While con-
fined to a state mental hospital, the plaintiff's mother was raped by a
fellow inmate. The plaintiff sued the state of New York for its negligence
in failing to safeguard her mother, resulting in the stigma of plaintiff's
bastardy. Refusing to follow the example of Zepeda, the trial court
held that a cause of action against the state was presented in the com-
plaint.26 The trial court was undeterred by lack of precedent and unim-
pressed by the examples of analogous undesirable suits cited in Zepeda.
27
17. Id. at 255, 195 N.E.2d at 856.
18. Id. at 255-58, 190 N.E.2d at 856-57; see also note 2 supra.
19. Id. at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
20. Id. at 247, 190 N.E.2d at 852.
21. Id. at 258, 190 N.E.2d at 857; see also the discussion in the text at II, A, infra.
22. Id. at 259-62, 190 N.E.2d at 858-59.
23. 198 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
24. Id. at 54.
25. 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd, 25 App. Div. 2d 906, 269
N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966), reversal aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885
(1966).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 830, 833, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 959, 962. See also Note, 4 DUQUESNE L. REV. 315
(1965-1966); Comment, 50 MN~N. L. REV. 593 (1966).
1968]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXII
Its intrepidity was rewarded by reversal.28 The New York Court of
Appeals noted that the impossibility of maintaining the action came not
so much from the difficulty in measuring damages but from the absence
in legal concepts of a "wrong" in terms of responsibility for the stigma
of illegitimacy.29
B. The Claim
Existing legal concepts do not bespeak a total absence of culpability
in the infliction of the stigma of bastardy. To be sure, the pedigree of
a wrongful life suit is doubtful. However, in view of the interests it would
protect, a kinship to existing causes of action does appear.30 A wrongful
life action would protect the recognized interest of the individual in
freedom from social embarrassment, as well as the interest in a normal
home. Suits for defamation and invasion of privacy protect the former
interest,3 ' while suits for alienation of affections protect the latter.32 A
suit for mental distress conceivably could protect both interests.
33
28. Williams v. State, 25 App. Div. 2d 906, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d
481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
29. Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 484, 223 N.E.2d 343, 344, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887-88
(1966).
30. See Note, 77 HARV. L. Rav. 1349, 1359 (1964).
31. See Comment, 50 MINN. L. REv. 593, 598-99 (1966); Note, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 212,
215 (1966).
32. See Note, 77 H~av. L. REV. 1349, 1350 (1964); Comment, 50 MINN. L. REv. 593,
598-99 (1966). See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS '§ 118 (3d ed. 1964); 42 CORNELL L.Q.
115 (1956). See also Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945) ; Russick v. Hicks, 85 F.
Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 7 N.E.2d 810 (1947);
Miller v. Monson, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949). Negligent interference with
parental affection may be compensable. See Foster, Relational Interests of the Family, 1962
U. ILL. L.F. 493, 509 (1962); Green, Protection of the Family Under Tort Law, 10 HASTINGS
L.J. 237, 238 (1959). However, statutory provisions may preclude such recovery. See note
33 infra.
33. See 55 Ky. L.J. 719, 722 (1966) ; Note, 50 Mum. L. REv. 593, 599 (1966). There is
a problem engendered by the statutory abolition of analogous relational interests. Causes of
action for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of contract
to marry have been abolished in many states. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 771.01 (1967) ; Kolkey v.
Grossinger, 195 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Liappas v. Augoustis, 47 So.2d 582 (Fla. 1950);
Rotwein v. Gersten, 160 Fla. 736, 36 So.2d 419 (1948). See also Feinsinger, Legislative At-
tack on "Heart Balm," 33 MIcH. L. REV. 979 (1935); 21 FLA. L.J. 245 (1947) ; Comment,
3 U. FLA. L. REv. 377 (1950).
The primary reason for the abolition of these remedies was that fraud and blackmail
often accompanied them. See Rotwein v. Gersten, supra. The remedies
. . . have been subjected to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance, embarras-
ment, humiliation and pecuniary damage to many persons wholly innocent and
free of any wrongdoing, who were merely the victims of circumstances, and such
remedies . . . furnished vehicles for the commission or attempted commission of
crime and in many cases have resulted in the perpetration of frauds, exploitation
and blackmail . . . . Preamble, Act of 1945, FLORIDA LAWS § 23138 (1945),
presently FLA. STAT. § 771.01 (1967).
A similar legislative interest in preventing blackmail and extortion might be found in
the prohibition against publishing the names of those persons involved in bastardy pro-
ceedings. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.09 (1967). However, such statutes appear designed as
much, if not more, for the protection of the reputation of the child involved in such pro-
ceedings, something akin to the prevention of a defamation. CI. FLA STAT. § 742.091 (1967)
("in the interests of the child"). In this manner there would appear to be legislative recog-
nition that bastards suffer the damage sought in a wrongful life action.
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The relative novelty of an action for wrongful life prompts inquiry
not only into its ancestry but also into such aspects as the conduct and
duty of the alleged tortfeasor, damages, immunity and socio-legal policy.
Particularly interrelated are the areas of conduct, duty and damages. It
is the conduct of the defendant that causes damage to the plaintiff.
Liability for the resulting damage depends upon whether the law im-
poses a duty on the defendant and reposes a right in the plaintiff with
respect to the conduct.
In discussing these aspects it is important to remember that an
action for wrongful life is concerned with a status and its social implica-
tions. A status of illegitimacy attaches to an individual according to the
compliance or non-compliance of his parents with laws governing mar-
riage. The law defines the status of an individual, but it is the conduct
of his parents that decides it. Essentially, the bastard's complaint is
that a willful omission of his parents decided his status as illegitimate,
and to his status are attached social consequences which constitute an
injury to him.34
II. THE NATURE OF THE CLAMl
A. Damages
The law compensates persons for injuries of a legally compensable
nature which are sustained in a legally disapproved manner. The type of
damages suffered by the wrongful life plaintiff, which are inherent in the
stigma of his status, are of a legally compensable nature.
The concept of "stigma" embodies two principal compon-
ents which are widely accepted as representing sufficient injuries
to sustain a cause of action in the law of torts. The "intrinsic"
component goes to the mental and emotional distress experi-
enced by an individual, and it is this element which is
compensable in actions for the invasion of privacy and the in-
tentional infliction of mental or emotional distress. The injuries
compensable in these causes of action are probably more
transitory than those an illegitimate might be expected to suffer
because of the nature of his birth. The "extrinsic" component
goes primarily to the deleterious effect upon one's reputation. It
is this injury to an individual's reputation that has long been
recognized as a basis for compensation in defamation actions.
There would seem to be little doubt that an illegitimate could
show this type of injury since the fact of his illegitimacy is
always present, and despite attempts to conceal it, his reputa-
tion would likely be severely damaged if his status were to
become public. ..
34. See notes 3-5 supra.
35. Comment, 49 IOWA L. REV. 1005, 1007-08 (1964). For a general discussion of
illegitimacy and its social implications, see L. YOUNG, OUT OF WEDLOCK (1954).
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It has been found that illegitimate children actually do suffer from
severe emotional distress, resulting in antisocial behavior,86 suggesting
the existence of "intrinsic" injuries. The similarity of "extrinsic" dam-
ages to those in a defamation action is particularly striking. If it is
an actionable slander to call a person a bastard, 7 it seems even more
culpable to cause him to be one. The infliction of illegitimacy is at least
as injurious as its imputation. In Pinkney the plaintiff likened her wrong-
ful life action to slander, posing this question:
If it be actionable to speak of one as a bastard, how much
more so is it to cause one to be a bastard? The latter "wrong"
is certainly more lasting than the calumny of mere words which
hopefully may soon be lost from the memory of one's contempo-
raries. Illegitimacy, however, is indelibly imprinted on the
appellant and those in like circumstance. Unlike slander, the
sting continues long after others have forgotten. It is painful
enough if the child alone knows. 8
As the court noted in Zepeda, "children born illegitimate have
suffered an injury. If legitimation does not take place, the injury is con-
tinuous. If legitimation cannot take place, the injury is irreparable ...
The injury is not as tangible as a physical defect but it is as real."39
Certain of the injuries sustained by a bastard, however, are not of a
type historically compensable under the common law. Only by statute
has a right to support from parents been recognized.4" With few excep-
tions the bastard cannot inherit from his father.4 1 Many of the depriva-
tions suffered by an illegitimate child would not be compensable even if
he were legitimate.
42
B. The Tortious Conduct
The conduct of the bastard's parents which causes injury is dual.
There is the affirmative act of sexual intercourse which results in the
36. Fodor, Emotional Trauma Resulting from Illegitimate Birth, 54 ARCHIVES OF
NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIATRY, 381, 382 (1945). See also Comment, Illegitimacy, Society and
the Law: A Private Tort Remedy for a Public Problem, 39 So. CAL. L. REV. 438, 445-47
(1966) ; Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 Am. J. SocIOLOGY 215 (1939) ; Po-
dolsky, The Emotional Problem of the Illegitimate Child, 70 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS 401
(1953); E. CHESSER, UNWANTED CHILD (1947); L. YOUNG, OUT OF WEDLOCK 158-60 (1954).
37. See note 3 supra. It is probable that a bastard could prove actual damages as in an
action for defamation not actionable per se. Where proof of illegitimacy is in a written
communication to a third person, there appears to be a type of libel actionable per se. Cf.
Hendricks v. Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank, 43 Ga. App. 408, 158 S.E. 915 (1931), rev'd on other
grounds, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S.E. 313 (1933); Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573,
162 S.W. 584 (1914).
38. 198 So.2d 52, 53 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
39. 41 II. App. 2d at 258, 190 N.E.2d at 857.
40. See note 8 supra.
41. Id.
42. See text accompanying note 17 supra. Similarly, he could not complain of a depriva-
tion of rights he never enjoyed, as his deprivation could only be that of an opportunity of
enjoying them. See Comment, 49 IOWA L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1964); Note, Compensation for
the Harmful Effects of Illegitimacy, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 127, 138 (1966) ; cf. Daily v.
Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).
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birth of the child. There is also an omission or inability to perform acts
which would make the child legitimate. The Zepeda court treated the
affirmative act of sexual intercourse, followed by a child being born
alive, as the tortious conduct.48 Although the court eventually con-
cluded that the plaintiff was capable of having legal rights regarding this
particular conduct,44 it also concluded that no legal duty could be imposed
upon such conduct absent legislative authority. 5
1. EXISTENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF
The Zepeda court faced difficulty in establishing the capability of
the plaintiff to have legal rights regarding the affirmative act with which
the court concerned itself. The difficulty stemmed from the argument that
the plaintiff did not exist at the time of the "tortious" affirmative act of
sexual intercourse.48 Beginning with Dietrich v. Inhabitants of North-
hampton,47 the rule was established that the nonexistence of the plaintiff
at the time of the defendant's act precluded an action for prenatal in-
juries. It was supposed that a person has no legal existence prior to birth,
in that he has no existence separate from his mother until then. Because
no duty of care is owed to a person whose existence the law does not
recognize, a prenatal injury action could not be maintained. In 1946,
Bonbrest v. Kotz48 held that a viable fetus could maintain an action for
injuries received while viable, thus extending legal recognition of exist-
ence to a time prior to birth. Prenatal injury cases since Bonbrest have
nearly abolished the viability distinction.49
Willing to recognize legal existence at conception, the Zepeda court
eliminated the nonexistent plaintiff argument and concluded that a tort
can be inflicted simultaneously with conception." Fearful of a biological
flaw in this reasoning, the court stated that the defendant could be liable
43. 41 Ill. App. 2d at 247-48, 190 N.E.2d at 852; see also Comment, Liability to Bastard
for Negligence Resulting in His Conception, 18 STAN. L. REV. 530, 535 (1966).
44. Id. at 247-53, 190 N.E.2d at 852-55.
45. Id. at 259-62, 190 N.E.2d at 857-59.
46. Id. at 248-53, 190 N.E.2d at 852-55.
47. 138 Mass. 14 (1884) (Holmes, J.).
48. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
49. See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727
(1956); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Poliquin v. MacDonald,
101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Keyes v. Construction Serv. Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165
N.E.2d 912 (1960); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953). See also
Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts: Actions for Wrongful Death, 15 RUTGERS L. REV.
61 (1960); Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 Micn. L. REv. 579 (1965); Note, The Case
of the Prenatal Injury, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 527 (1963); Note, The Impact of Medical Knowl-
edge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554 (1962).
50. 41 Ill. App. 2d at 248-53, 190 N.E.2d at 852-55. Viewing conception as a sequential
act, the wrongful life plaintiff could exist at its culmination. Although fertilization does not
take place until after the act of intercourse, there is an analogy to the firing and impact of a
bullet. Just as the sequential act of firing a bullet can include its detonation, flight and im-
pact, the act of conception could be considered to begin with ejaculation and end with union
of the gametes. So considered, the plaintiff would achieve first existence during the culmina-
tion of the defendant's act.
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even were the act to have been completed before the plaintiff's conception.
The court stated that "it makes no difference how much time elapses be-
tween a wrongful act and a resulting injury if there is a causal connection
between them."'" The court suggested that a person injured by an article
negligently manufactured prior to his birth, or a person born malformed
because of negligent injuries to his parent's genes occuring prior to his
conception, should not be denied recovery.5 2 The court also noted the
case of Piper v. Hoard53 in which a plaintiff was allowed to recover for
injuries suffered from a fraudulent misrepresentation to her mother be-
fore the mother's marriage and the plaintiff's conception. Thus the court
concluded that it was of no particular importance that the plaintiff
might not have existed at the time of the defendant's act of procreating
him, 4 this act being considered that of which the wrongful life plaintiff
complains.
2. THE OMISSION TO ACT
By its emphasis on the affirmative act of sexual intercourse and its
failure to discuss the omission or inability of the defendant to perform
acts legitimating the plaintiff, the Zepeda court ignored the grava-
men of the claim and was unable to formulate a coherent theory of
liability.55 The plaintiff claims injury not solely as a result of his birth,
but because of the consequences of the status attaching to his birth. The
affirmative act of sexual intercourse causes the plaintiff's birth, but it is
the omission or inability to perform acts of marriage which causes his
status of illegitimacy. It is legal and social disapprobation of his status
51. 41 Ill. App. 2d at 250, 190 N.E.2d at 853.
52. Id. at 250-51, 190 N.E.2d at 853-54.
53. 107 N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 626 (1887).
54. 41 Ill. App. 2d at 252-53, 190 N.E.2d at 855.
55. In considering this the tortious act, the court was in good company. See Comment,
49 IOWA L. REV. 1005 (1964); Comment, 50 MIqm. L. REV. 593 (1966); Note, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 212 (1966); Ploscowe, An Action for Wrongful Life, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1078 (1963) ; cf.
W. PROSSER, TORTS '§ 1 (3d ed. 1964).
56. "The plaintiff's action should not, however, be seen as based upon any wrongful-
ness in his being conceived but upon the legally disapproved circumstances under which his
parents' intercourse took place and the failure of his parents to marry subsequent to his
conception." Note, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1349, 1351 (1964).
An alternative to the "wrongful life" theory advanced [in Zepeda] . . .which
would avoid most of the problems in that approach, would be to adopt a tort
limited to the narrower concept of illegitimacy. The basis of this tort would be
recognition of a legal duty on the part of the father to legitimatize his children,
a duty which could be discharged by marrying the mother or adopting the child.
The wrongful act would be the breach of this legally imposed duty rather than
illicit intercourse. The imposition of such a duty on the father of an illegitimate
child has support in the traditional duties of parents toward their children ...
In [Zepeda] there would be a concurrence of the parent-child relationship with
the defendant's act being responsible for the plaintiff's predicament, the result being
to avoid the harm to the plaintiff which could be discharged by legitimating him.
In a situation such as [Zepeda,] .. .where the father was married to someone
other than the illegitimate child's mother, it would be undesirable, if not impossible,
for the father to accomplish legitimation by marrying the mother. However, the fact
that a defendant cannot specifically perform a legal obligation should not give
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that causes the bastard to lose inheritance and support rights or to suffer
social degradation and mental anguish. He seeks redress for a continuing
injury:57 a stigma resulting from the omission of his parents to avail
themselves of the services of the clergy.
That the cases did not consider the claim of the plaintiff with regard
to the omission is apparent from the discussion in Zepeda of the "non-
existence of the plaintiff" argument. The continuing inaction of the par-
ents confers upon the wrongful life plaintiff the status of illegitimacy, a
status of which he complains. Presumably the law does not operate upon
that which it does not recognize to exist. Illegitimacy being a legal status,
it could not attach to the plaintiff until legal existence, and hence the
plaintiff could not be injured by the status until after his legally recog-
nized existence.
The moment at which the plaintiff's legal existence is recognized
could assume some importance regarding the time at which damages
would first begin to affect the plaintiff and the time at which a cause of
action might be considered to accrue. The nature of the plaintiff's in-
juries and the omission causing them are such that a continuous injury
would be inflicted after birth when the plaintiff appreciates the harm.5 8
The cause of action should not accrue nor the statute of limitations be-
gin to run until the damages are suffered.59
3. THE "CBENEFIT OF LIFE"
Because the courts considered procreation the act and birth itself
the injury, they were perplexed in assessing damages by the presumed
benefit of life conferred concurrently with the supposedly injurious
birth."0 By considering the omission as the injurious act, the question of
whether a benefit of life should preclude or be set off against recovery is
eliminated. The law does not assign the causation of tortious acts to the
fertility of Adam.6' No more does it search back to procreation to find
an "original" cause of injuries sustained by a child from his parents,
him immunity to a suit for damages. Note, 9 UTAH L. REV. 187, 190 (1964) (foot-
notes omitted).
57. "In a suit for being born illegitimate the damages do not really occur 'simultane-
ously with conception,' but begin with birth and continue throughout life." Note, 38 U.
CoLo. L. Rav. 285, 287 (1966).
58. Id.
59. Presumably the statute of limitations period would be four years in Florida. See
FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (1967). Assuming the cause of action were to be allowed, the damages
compensable in view of the limitations period may be only those which occurred within
four years of the time of suit in addition to those for prospective future injury.
60. See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 IM. App. 2d 240, 258, 190 N.E.2d 849, 857 (1963);
Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 484-85, 223 N.E.2d 343, 344-45, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 888
(1966) (concurring opinion). See also Comment, 50 MmrN. L. REv. 593, 598-99 (1966);
Note, 31 ALBANY L. REV. 381, 386 (1967); Note, Compensation for the Harmful Effects of
Illegitimacy, 66 CoTAJM. L. REv. 127, 138 (1966) ; Note, 9 UTAn L. REV. 808 (1965).
61. Genesis 4.
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with an incidental concurrent benefit. To do so would under all circum-
stances preclude or limit recovery by a child for a wrongful act or omis-
sion of his parent occurring after his birth because a benefit of life is
always conferred by a parent.
4. THE PARENTAL CONDUCT
The conduct of the parents is dual, involving volition both as to
the decision to engage in intercourse and as to the decision not to marry.
The decision to engage in intercourse may be voluntary or involuntary,
with states of mind induced by intent, recklessness, negligence, coercion
or mistake. The decision not to marry may be voluntary or involuntary
with similar possible states of mind and additionally a possible inability
to marry due perhaps to death or a previous marriage. Considering the
natural parents in combination, a wide variety of circumstances may
result in the illegitimacy of a child because both parents need not nec-
essarily decide to engage in intercourse or not to marry for the same
reason.
That an illegitimate child should seek to sue his father for conduct
resulting in a type of slanderous damage after birth is not without prece-
dent in the law. In Garcia v. Fantauzzi62 the plaintiff was a "natural
child" 3 under Puerto Rican statutory law but would have been an
illegitimate child under the common law. The child sued his father for
breach of the statutory duty upon the father of a natural child to recog-
nize him, which recognition would have conferred certain benefits on the
child. Because the father's avoidance of this duty was effected by
fraudulently inducing the mother and another to execute a recognition
of the plaintiff, he sued the father also for "his wrongful acts in causing
the plaintiff to be reputed as tfie son of an uneducated negro barber of no
means or standing, and of immoral life and habits, under whose care and
influence plaintiff was forced to live ... .2
The court stated that:
[T]he real father, upon whom rested the primary duty of sup-
port and education, may be held for damages resulting from
his failure of duty, effected and aggravated by the harmful
means (the fraudulent ascription of negro parentage) used to
escape that duty .... 65
The gravamen of the case is that plaintiff is entitled to
damages because of defendant's fraud in preventing him from
asserting the truth as to his paternity, and as a means of effect-
62. 20 F.2d 524 (Ist Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 571 (1927).
63. A natural child is one who is born of unmarried parents who could have married
at the time of the child's birth. Id. at 525.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 527-58.
COMMENTS
ing it, conspiring with others to cause the boy's paternity to be
ascribed to the negro barber .... 6
In the Garcia case an omission, coupled with an affirmative act, by
the father after the birth of his illegitimate child caused what was con-
sidered an essentially slanderous imputation of the child's parentage. In
a wrongful life action the father of an illegitimate child causes by omission
what otherwise would be a slanderous imputation of parentage.
Though generally not accompanied by affirmative acts of harm, the
conduct of the parents resulting in the stigma of illegitimacy should be
examined focusing on volition. The omission to marry may at times
result from circumstances where no duty would be imposed, and the




In one typical circumstance both parents voluntarily engage in
intercourse which impregnates the mother, followed by the refusal of
one parent, for example the father, to marry the other. 8 The father's
intentional refusal to exercise his power to legitimize the child deprives
the mother of her power to legitimize him, and the consequent injury
to the child results.
A number of legal principles, applicable in analogous circumstances
in which the law imposes tort liability, would support recovery against
the father in this situation. Although the general rule is that there is
no liability for nonfeasance, intentional or not,0 9 a special relationship
may result in a duty of affirmative action. Thus "if the actor does an
act, and subsequently realizes or should realize that it has created an
unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to another, he is under a
duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking effect.1
70
66. Id. at 527.
67. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 9 (3d ed. 1964); see also People v. Minkowski, 204 Cal.
App. 2d 832, 23 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1962).
68. The refusal would not necessarily be limited to the father, as either parent could
refuse to marry the other. The result is somewhat worse, however, where the father does
not marry the mother nor recognize the child.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 314 (1965):
The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary
for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take
such action.
See also Toadvine v. Cincinnatti, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry., 20 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Ky.
1937); Gilbert v. Gwin-McCollom Funeral Home, Inc., 268 Ala. 372, 106 So.2d 646 (1958) ;
Allen v. Hixon, 111 Ga. 460, 36 S.E. 810 (1900); Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E.
301 (1928); Schichowski v. Hoffmann, 261 N.Y. 389, 185 N.E. 676 (1933); Yania v. Bigan,
397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959); Riley v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry., 160 S.W. 595 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1913).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 321(1) (1965). See also Trombley v. Kolts,
29 Cal. App. 2d 699, 85 P.2d 541 (1938); Northern Cent. Ry. v. State ex rel. Price, 29 Md.
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It is true that the risk of injury jeopardizing the wrongful life
plaintiff is not one of impending physical harm, but rather of mental
harm and injury to reputation. However, because recovery has been
allowed before for the intentional infliction of emotional distress," the
type of injury suffered should not be a reason for denial of recovery.72
"The injury is not as tangible as a physical defect but it is as real,73
and it is no less intentional because it results from omission. The princi-
ple supporting the rule would mitigate toward the imposition of a duty
of affirmative action upon the parent of a bastard due to the relationship
in which the parent causes the risk of injury to the child, has the power
to prevent the risk from taking effect, but intentionally refuses to take
affirmative action.
The relationship between parent and child is a particularly close
one and strongly impels imposition of a duty of affirmative action.74
A duty of affirmative action has been imposed upon parents in other
situations because of this relationship, 75 and its breach has at times
resulted in criminal liability.76 The relationship exists between parents
and illegitimate,77 as well as legitimate children. 8
Another principle would appear to apply in view of the father's
prevention of the mother's exercise of her power to legitimate the bas-
tard. It is a common rule of tort liability that "one who intentionally
prevents a third person from giving to another aid necessary to prevent
physical harm is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the
other by the absence of the aid which he has prevented the third person
420, 96 Am. Dec. 545 (1868); cf. Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co., 128 N.C. 229, 38
S.E. 878 (1901). The rule applies even where the original act is innocent. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 321(2) (1965) ; In re Pennsylvania R.R., 48 F.2d 559 (3d Cir. 1931),
cert. denied, 284 U.S. 640 (1931); Hardy v. Brooks, 103 Ga. App. 124, 118 S.E.2d 492
(1961); Hollinbeck v. Downey, 26 Minn. 481, 113 N.W.2d 9 (1962).
71. See e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282
(1952) (Traynor, J.) ; Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932) ;
Scheman v. Schlein, 35 Misc. 2d 581, 231 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Samms v. Eccles,
11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961).
72. A libel action based on printed matter could be analyzed as to a failure to remove
the offensive matter before printing or sale.
73. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 258, 190 N.E.2d 849, 857 (1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
74. See W. PROSSER, TORTS '§ 54 (3d ed. 1964).
75. Particularly regarding support and custody. Additionally, the duty can arise in
criminal law. See note 76 infra.
76. Rex v. Russell [1933] Vict. L.R. 59. The defendant was found guilty of manslaughter
for watching his wife drown herself and their two infant children without taking action to
prevent it. See also Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 164 A.2d 467 (1960) ; Note, 47 HARV. L.
REV. 531 (1934).
77. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 322 Mass. 523, 78 N.E.2d 644 (1948). See also Note,
9 UTAH L. REV. 187, 190 (1964).
78. See generally, Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as the Basis of Tort Liability,
56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 316 (1908); McNiece & Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58
YALE L.J. 1272 (1949) ; W. PROSSER, TORTS '§ 54 (3d ed. 1964) ; Seavey, I Am Not My Guest's
Keeper, 13 VAND. L REV. 699 (1960); Comment, Liability for Negative Conduct, 35 VA. L.
REV. 446 (1949).
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from giving. '79 Again, though the harm is not physical it is nonetheless
injurious. Another rule of tort liability is that an actor "who knows or
has reason to know that by his conduct, whether tortious or innocent, he
has caused such bodily harm to another as to make him helpless and in
danger of further harm,... is under a duty to exercise reasonable care
to prevent such further harm." '
If his act, or an instrumentality within his control, has inflicted
upon another such harm that the other is helpless and in danger,
and a reasonable man would recognize the necessity of aiding or
protecting him to avert further harm, the actor is under a duty
to take such action even though he may not have been originally
at fault.8 '
To a degree the principles inherent in this rule suggest liability, par-
ticularly for the protracted injuries suffered by a continuous refusal to
marry, since after birth it is still possible to marry and legitimize a
bastard." To do so would prevent at least some damage.
One can arguably analogize the father of the wrongful life plaintiff
to a manufacturer of chattels. "The manufacturer of a chattel which he
knows or has reason to know to be, or to be likely to be, dangerous for
use is subject to the liability of a supplier of chattels with such knowl-
edge.'8 3 A manufacturer who places in the stream of commerce a dele-
terious product endangering others is under a duty to take such action
as will protect others from injury. 4 This rule suggests liability in a
wrongful life action, where the wound which begins upon the mattress
is as harmful as that which has its start within it. 5
The case of the adulterine bastard is somewhat different. The
parent's refusal would be less an intentional omission than an inability
to perform the omitted act. However, there is an analogy to the driver
who knowingly operates a vehicle without brakes. A person injured by
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 326 (1965). See also Eclipse Lumber Co. v.
Davis, 196 Iowa 1349, 195 N.W. 337 (1923); Metallic Compression Casting Co. v. Fitchburg
Ry., 109 Mass. 277, 12 Am. Rep. 689 (1872); Phenix Ins. Co. v. New York Cent. & Hudson
River R.R., 122 App. Div. 113, 106 N.Y.S. 696 (1907), aff'd, 196 N.Y. 554, 90 N.E. 1164
(1909) ; Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Simmons Co., 167 Wis. 541, 168 N.W. 199 (1918).
80. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 322 (1965). See also Trombley v. Kolts, 29
Cal. App. 2d 699, 85 P.2d 541 (1938); Northern Cent. Ry. v. State ex rel. Price, 29 Md.
420, 96 Am. Dec. 545 (1868).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS -§ 322, comment a (1965). See also L.S. Ayres &
Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334 (1942); Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135
So.2d 145 (La. App. 1961) ; cf. Whitesides v. Southern Ry., 128 N.C. 229, 38 S.E. 878 (1901).
82. FLA. STAT. § 731.29 (1967).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 394 (1965).
84. See, e.g., Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co., 171 N.C. 33, 87 S.E. 958 (1916).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395, comment d, illustration 1 (1965):
A manufactures a mattress. Through the carelessness of one of A's employees
a spring inside of the mattress is not properly tied down. A sells the mattress to
B, a dealer, who resells it to C. C sleeps on the mattress, and is wounded in the
back by the sharp point of the spring. The wound becomes infected, and C suffers
serious illness. A is subject to liability to C.
See also Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d 331 (1956).
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the driver's inability to stop his vehicle might establish liability for the
foreseeable inability to stop where, had the driver had brakes, he would
have been able to do so.s The statutes requiring brakes on vehicles,8 7
upon which liability could also be predicated, would be analogous to
adultery statutes."' To say that the class of people intended to be pro-
tected by adultery statutes does not include illegitimate children would
be like saying that the statutes requiring brakes are for the protection
of the occupants of vehicles and not innocent persons likely to be injured
by unimpeded vehicles. The unborn illegitimate child could be considered
to be among the class of people likely to be injured by adultery. Both
the brake and adultery statutes are for the protection of the public
generally.
Where, as in Zepeda, the act of fornication by the adulterous father
was preceded by a fraudulent promise of marriage, the wrongful life
plaintiff could also proffer the argument that he constitutes a third party
beneficiary of a promise, the breach of which involves tort liability.
Liability would be akin to that imposed upon those who negligently per-
form an undertaking to render services.8 9 There would be an actual
reliance by the mother and a type of compulsory reliance by the plaintiff
beneficiary because he would be unable to take steps to better his position.
In both of the above situations the mother, because she is unable
to legitimize the plaintiff due to the refusal or previous marriage of the
father, might argue that her failure to marry the father should not result
in liability. However, her inability is not any less an actual cause of the
illegitimacy of the plaintiff, and it would appear to be a foreseeable
cause.90 It might be her burden either to prove that her conduct did not
cause the harm,9' or to suffer the consequences of her dilemma.
86. Violation of a statute requiring brakes is prima facie evidence of negligence. Anchor
Hocking Glass Corp. v. Allen, 161 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
87. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 317.611 (1967).
88. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 798.01 (1967).
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965):
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for a consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's
person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
See also Mallett v. Southern Ry., 20 Cal. App. 2d 500, 68 P.2d 281 (1937); Maddock v.
Riggs, 106 Kan. 808, 190 P. 12 (1920); Abresch v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 246 Minn.
408, 75 N.W.2d 206 (1956) ; Siegal v. Spear & Co., 195 App. Div. 845, 187 N.Y.S. 284 (1921),
aff'd, 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414 (1923).
There is some difficulty in this approach because of the similarity the argument has
to causes of action for breach of promise to marry which have been abolished by statute.
See note 33 supra.
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 (1965). See also McNello v. John B.
Kelly, Inc., 283 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1960) ; New York Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Rataj, 73 F.2d 184
(3d Cir. 1934); Troietto v. G.H. Hammond Co., 110 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1940); West v.
Molders Foundry Co., 342 Mass. 8, 171 N.E.2d 860 (1961); Miller v. Board of Educ., 291
N.Y. 25, 50 N.E.2d 529 (1943).
91. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS '§ 433B (1965). See also O'Conner v. Boulder
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Where the mother has been raped and fails to marry her rapist,
resulting in the illegitimacy of the child, it is clear that she should not
be liable. In such a situation, due to the lack of volition, the conduct
placing the plaintiff in a position of peril would not be her action, and
the special relationship upon which liability for nonfeasance historically
has been based would not exist. The law has not required a person to
affirmatively perform a dangerous or distasteful act necessary to extract
another from a peril resulting from an unwanted, and in fact resisted,
act of a third person. 2
2. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Although it is apparent that the law compensates injuries similar
to the type suffered by the bastard and has imposed liability in analogous
circumstances, the plaintiff seeks to impose liability predicated upon
nonfeasance and involving a duty of affirmative action. It is true that as
a general rule the law does not impose upon persons an affirmative duty to
marry." The law does, however, impose a duty upon persons to refrain
Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 107 Colo. 290, 111 P.2d 633 (1941); Rutherford v. Modem
Bakery, 310 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. 1958); Kramer Serv., Inc. v. Wilkins, 184 Miss. 483, 186
So. 625 (1939).
92. RESTATEMFNT (SFcoND) OF TORTS 4 314 (1965). This would be an appropriate
situation for application of the general rule. This situation is similar to the factual circum-
stances presented in Williams v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965),
rev'd, 25 App. Div. 2d 906, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966), reversal aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223
N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966), discussed in the text at note 25 supra. In this regard
the New York Court of Appeals was correct in stating that the law does not recognize a
concept of legal "wrong" in causing a person to be born a bastard. The Williams situation
is analogous to that of a bystander who, though perhaps under a duty of affirmative action
to aid a third person, has not the means of aiding him.
93. See Note, Compensation for the Harmful Effects of Illegitimacy, 66 CoLum. L. REV.
127, 146-49; 9 UTAH L. REV. 187, 190-91 (1964). It has been noted that:
[Ilt is, at best, a doubtful social policy to try to compel a marriage, considering
the potential enmity and rancor between the "shotgunned" parents, and the result-
ing adverse emotional influences on the child. The social blunder of forcing unwilling
parties to marry has been acknowledged before. Note, Compensation for the Harmful
Effects of Illegitimacy, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 127, 138 n.88 (1966).
It is difficult to understand how much greater the compulsion of a wrongful life action
would be than that of support statutes. Though there would be some, perhaps additional,
compulsion, the fact remains that an illegitimate child does suffer damage; a damage of a
kind compensable by the law. The above criticism is prompted by the existence of "heart
balm" statutes. See note 33 supra. Those statutes were a result of fraudulent and coercive
claims and a lack of confidence in courts as reasoning institutions capable of separating fact
from fancy and merit from abuse.
Though legislatures are quick to act to correct an abuse, if and when it may occur, they
are less prone to act to remedy an existing wrong, particularly in the field of tort law. See
Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 787 (1963); Green, The Thrust of Tort Law-Part I: The Influence of
Environment, 64 W. VA. L. REV. 115 (1962); Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in
Negligence Actions, 49 COLUm. L. REV. 21 (1949) ; Stone, The Common Law in the United
States, 50 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1936). It is desirable to deter illegitimacy, and a wrongful life
action would have a deterrent effect. See Comment, Illegitimacy, Society and the Law:
A Private Tort Remedy for a Public Problem, 39 So. CAL. L. REv. 438, 449-61 (1966).
"Because the existing remedies, such as paternity suits and legitimation, provide illegitimate
children with inadequate compensation, the courts should respond to the need for a superior
remedy by recognizing an action for wrongful life." Id. at 461. The deterrent effect and the
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from causing certain of the damages suffered by a bastard.94 Additionally,
despite requiring mutual consent to marry, the law does encourage mar-
riage to an extent by the very existence of support statutes.9 5
A wrongful life action is directed more toward compensating for
the failure to marry than toward encouraging marriage. It would remain
within the power of the parents to exercise a choice as to marriage. The
bastard has no such power, but a wrongful life action would provide
him with compensation for an injurious choice made by his parents.
3. RELATED CLAIMS
The myriad circumstances which might result in a bastard child, as
revealed by emphasis on the omission as well as the affirmative act, serve
to distinguish undesirable related suits such as those which persuaded
the Zepeda court to deny the bastard's claim for relief. The court feared
that "one might seek damages for being born of a certain color, another
because of race; one for being born with a hereditary disease, another
for inheriting unfortunate family characteristics .... ," Such malforma-
tions or characteristics occurring as the result of natural genetic processes
would not result in liability of the parents because no omission to act
would exist where no action could be taken. The same would be true even
of artificially caused malformations. Whether a child malformed by
artificial genetic processes could state a cause of action based on fore-
seeability would not be of concern in examining a wrongful life claim.
As the court noted, neither a legitimate child nor an illegitimate
child could maintain an action against a parent for causing a divorce
which has broken up the homey Not only is divorce a legally sanctioned
process, but the damages sustained by the issue of divorced parents is
not of a compensable type. Certainly a divorce action would not concern
a bastard; in order to be a divorce there must first be a marriage.
There seems to be some analogy of a wrongful life suit to another
claim the encouragement of which was feared by the Zepeda court. The
court feared that one might be encouraged to sue for being born into a
large and destitute family. However, a judgment against a destitute
parent, whatever it would be worth,9 would not come about because
need for compensation by additional remedies warrant judicial recognition of the action.
Id. at 449-61; see also 28 ALBANY L. REv. 174 (1964).
94. See the discussion in text at I, B and II, A, supra. See also Comment, 49 IOWA L.
REv. 1005, 1010-11 (1964); Comment, Illegitimacy, Society, and the Law: A Private Tort
Remedy for a Public Problem, 39 So. CAL. L. Rav. 438, 460-61 (1966).
95. See note 8 supra.
96. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 260, 190 N.E.2d 849, 858 (1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 94S (1964).
97. Id. at 255, 190 N.E.2d at 856.
98. Id. at 260, 190 N.E.2d at 888.
99.
The prospective illegitimacy suit could be invoked, as a practical matter, only by
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this financial interest of a child has not been recognized beyond the duty
of a parent to support his children. The law already protects and requires
support of children.
An interesting question was posed by the Zepeda court as to arti-
ficially inseminated children.100 It has been held that heterologously
artificially inseminated children are not illegitimate where the insemina-
tion apparently was by sperm of the husband of the mother.' 0' However,
the same jurisdiction has held that a child resulting from artificial insem-
ination by a third party donor is illegitimate. 02 Depending on the
strength of the presumption of legitimacy of children born in wedlock,
the results of artificially inseminated child cases probably will vary. At
this point the status of children produced by artificial insemination is
in doubt. 03 However, where and when such children are considered
illegitimate, it would seem that their case for a cause of action for wrong-
ful life would be as strong as that of more mundane bastards.
One quite speculative question posed by the Zepeda court concerned
the status of "children" resulting from synthesization of life. 04 Con-
ceivably such beings might be classed as illegitimates, if and when they
exist, though to do so would be to add a strained new dimension to the
phrase "born out of wedlock." Assuming a wrongful life action should
be available to all who suffer damages from illegitimacy, such beings
might be entitled to it. Whether they would be able to prove damages
would be speculative. They might be quite respected, for their creation
would be a monumental human achievement.
D. Parental Immunity
An important consideration in a suit for wrongful life is the doctrine
of parental tort immunity. According to this doctrine a suit by a child
claimants whose parents are affluent enough to satisfy a judgment above the
ordinary support liability. The large number of fathers presently unable to satisfy
judgments obtained against them in statutory support proceedings suggests that the
proposed cause of action would have very limited utility. Furthermore, viewing
the bastard child's action as a deterrent designed to diminish the number of
illegitimate births does little to alter this conclusion. Attaching financial con-
sequences to sexual irresponsibility through bastardy proceedings has apparently
failed to alter the incidence of illegitimacy. Procreation of a bastard child is more
likely to result from passion or ignorance-essentially non-deterable conduct-
than from specific intent . . . . Note, Compensation for the Harmful Effects of
Illegitimacy, 66 CoLum. L. REV. 127, 147-48 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
100. 41 Ill. App. 2d at 260-63, 190 N.E.2d at 858-59.
101. Strnad v. Stmad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948). Apparently
the sperm was not that of a third party donor because the court stated that there was no
difference between the child whose status was in question and a child born out of wedlock
and later made legitimate by the inter-marriage of the interested parties. Although the
court referred to the child as "adopted or semi-adopted," it apparently did so for lack of
any other description.
102. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
103. See Biskind, Legitimacy of Children Born of Artificial Insemination, 5 J. FAX.
LAW 39 (1965). See also Comment, Human Artificial Insemination: An Analysis and Proposal
for Florida, 22 U. MiAMi L. REV. 000 (1968).
104. 41 li. App. 2d at 261-62, 190 N.E.2d at 859.
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against his parent cannot be maintained. However, because of the limita-
tions and exceptions to this doctrine it probably would have limited appli-
cation to a wrongful life action.
The history of the doctrine is relatively recent and rather unusual.
Citing neither precedent nor authority and relying only on the vagaries
of public policy, the 1891 case of Hewlett v. George'0 5 quite literally
created the doctrine.0" Although the case was soon followed in cases
involving even very atrocious acts, °7 courts have not agreed upon the
reasons for the application of the doctrine and have created exceptions
to it or limitations upon it.
1. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
Certain aspects of a family relationship have been influential as
reasons for applying parental immunity. 08 Courts have hesitated to
unnecessarily and perhaps irreparably disrupt family unity and tran-
quility by allowing family disputes to be aired in public litigation. 0 9 The
necessity of discretionary parental discipline of children" and the fear
of collusion in suits involving insurance have been offered as reasons for
invoking the doctrine."' It has also been stated that depletion of the
105. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). For general discussion of parental immunity see
Comment, 12 S.D.L. REv. 364 (1967); Cooperrider, Child v. Parent in Tort: A Case for the
Jury, 43 MiNN. L. REV. 73 (1958) ; McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation,
43 HARV. L. REV. 1030 (1930); McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VIL. L. REV.
521 (1960); Note, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 462 (1953); Comment, 48 IOWA L. REV. 748 (1963);
Comment, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152 (1961); W. PROSSER, TORTS '§ 116 (3d ed. 1964); Sanford,
Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REV. 823 (1956).
106. The textwriters of the nineteenth century were in disagreement over the ability of
a child to sue its parents prior to the case. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905
(1930); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030,
1059-60 (1930). Some cases prior to Hewlett did analyze the authority of persons in loco
parentis. See Gould v. Christianson, 10 F. Cas. 857 (No. 5636) (D.C.N.Y. 1836); Nelson v.
Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885) ; Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859).
107. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (cruel and inhumane
treatment); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (incestuous rape), overruled
in Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). Parental immunity was asserted
in Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. App. 577 (1895), and was allowed on public policy grounds without
citing Hewlett. The Hewlett decision soon became the general rule and evidently remains so
today. Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423 (1951); 39 Am. JuR. Parent and Child § 90 (1942).
108. A common analogy cited by courts has been to the immunity between husband
and wife. See Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929) ; Luster v. Luster, 229
Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938). The analogy has been criticized as paradoxical and inap-
plicable. See McCurdy, supra note 101 at 1074; PROSSER, supra note 100 at 886.
109. This reason is generally asserted. See, e.g., Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145
A. 753 (1929); Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924); Small v. Morrison,
185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923) ; Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551
(1928). See also McCurdy, supra note 101, at 1074-76.
110. Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 305, 218 P.2d 445, 455 (1950); Matarese v.
Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925) ; Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 642, 251 P.2d 149
(1952); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927); cf. Meehan v. Meehan, 133
So.2d 776 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961). See also McCurdy, supra note 101, at 1076-77.
111. Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J.
247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960) ; Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957). But cf. Briere v.
Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966).
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family estate to the advantage of one child over another is a reason for
the rule.112 Another reason cited is the apparent anomaly that would
result were the father, as heir, to succeed to damages which the law
wrested from him. 118 Families thus have been treated somewhat as small
self-governing units with an immunity of parents analogous to that of a
sovereign," 4 and in some states the immunity has been extended to per-
sons in loco parentis.15
Certain exceptions to the doctrine have evolved where a nonfamily
status or relationship is presented. The existence of a master-servant," 16
carrier-passenger" 17 or vocational status"18 has been held to create an
exception to the immunity concomitant to a parental status. Some courts
have considered that the existence of insurance is reason for an excep-
tion,"x9 though this has been criticized by other courts. Some courts also
have limited the doctrine, as by refusing to extend its application to
persons in loco parentis120 or by holding that emancipation'
2' or death' 2
terminates the family relationship which is the basis for the rule.
2. TRENDS IN EMPHASIS
Two different emphases are possible in applying the doctrine. The
immunity could be based on the family relationship existing at the time
of the tortious parental act or upon the family relationship existing at
the time of litigation. Questions regarding collusion and insurance, de-
pletion of the family estate, succession to damages by a parent, and death
112. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905). See also McCurdy, supra note
101, at 1073-74.
113. Id. Cf. Russell v. Meehan, 141 So.2d 332 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); Rehe v. Airport
U-Drive, Inc., 63 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1953).
114. Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925). This has been criticized
as an obsolete concept. See McCurdy, supra note 101, at 1076.
115. Chastain v. Chastain, 50 Ga. App. 241, 177 S.E. 828 (1934); Cook v. Cook, 232
Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675 (1939). See also 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 61 (1950). See
generally Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423 (1951).
116. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); cf. Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo.
App. 266, 157 S.W. 133 (1913).
117. Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Worrell v. Worrell, 174
Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939) ; cf. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956) ;
Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965); Henderson v. Henderson, 11 Misc. 2d
449, 169 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Lusk v. Lusk, 133 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
118. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952) ; Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.
2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
119. Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966) ; Lusk v. Lusk, 133 W. Va. 17,
166 S.E. 538 (1932). See also Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 262, 212 N.W. 787, 788 (1927)
(dissenting opinion).
120. Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939); Cwik v. Zylstra, 58 N.J.
Super. 29, 155 A.2d 277 (1959).
121. Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 354 S.W.2d 789 (1962). The question is one of fact.
Compare Thompson v. Thompson, 264 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1954) with Crosby v. Crosby, 230
App. Div. 651, 246 N.Y.S. 384 (1930). The child is presumed unemancipated. Bulloch v.
Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932).
122. Chastain v. Chastain, 50 Ga. App. 241, 177 S.E. 828 (1934) ; Brennecke v. Kilpatrick,
336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957). But see
Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940).
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or emancipation generally emphasize the family relationship, unity and
tranquility existing at the time of suit. Questions of dual status or dis-
cretionary parental discipline generally require emphasis upon the family
relationship existing at the time of the tort. The modern emphasis has
been upon the family relationship existing at the time of the tort, and
where the original act was willful 123 or malicious 124 or did not involve
the exercise of parental duty or discretion, 25 the immunity rule has
been abrogated.
3. THE FLORIDA POSITION
Florida appears to follow the majority rule of parental immunity.
In Meehan v. Meehan'2' it was held that a child was immune from a
suit instituted by a parent. Although one trial court allowed a child to
recover from a parent in a wrongful death action involving a willful and
wanton tort,127 in Rickard v. Rickard'28 parental immunity was applied
in a child's suit for negligence despite the existence of insurance.
4. SUITS BY ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
The very few cases which have considered the immunity of parents
from suits by their illegitimate children have done so with regard to the
exceptions, limitations and purposes of the rule. A child formerly illegit-
imate but legitimated by a subsequent marriage was treated as a legitimate
child. 2 ' Where a relationship of in loco parentis existed, a jurisdiction
recognizing the in loco parentis extension applied the immunity." 0 Con-
versely, where the act fell within the willful and malicious tort exception,
the doctrine was not applied."' Garcia v. Fantauzzi"2 is authority for
the proposition that where no family unit or in loco parentis relationship
exists, there is no justification for applying the rule.
Because of the frequent criticism of the immunity rule and the
123. Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939) ; Gillett v. Gillett, 168 Cal. App.
2d 102, 335 P.2d 736 (1959); Treschmann v. Treschmann, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961
(1901).
124. Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952) ; Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7
Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956) ; Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
125. Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Ertl v. Ertl, Wis. 2d 372, 141
N.W.2d 208 (1966); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). Because of
the numerous exceptions, the immunity rule often has little force. Siembab v. Siembab, 202
Misc. 1053, 112 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Comment, 12 S.D.L. REV. 364, 365 (1967).
126. 133 So.2d 776 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
127. Henderson v. Henderson, 14 Fla. Supp. 181 (Ct. Rec. Escambia County 1958).
128. 203 So.2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
129. Borzik v. Miller, 22 Fay. L.J. 5 (C.P. Fayette County 1958), af'd on other
grounds, 399 Pa. 293, 159 A.2d 741 (1960).
130. Caringe v. Rubin, 13 App. Div. 2d 593, 212 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1961).
131. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). The court expressly refused
to decide whether the doctrine of parental immunity could be applied in a suit by an ille-
gitimate child.
132. 20 F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 571 (1927).
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modern trend to limit or make exceptions to its application, it appears
that any immunity of a parent from suit by an illegitimate child should
be limited to those cases where an actual family unit exists and the act
is committed within the scope of parental duty and authority.
In such cases as Zepeda v. Zepeda the father certainly should not
be allowed to avail himself of the parental immunity doctrine, as no
reason for applying it would exist in the absence of a family relation-
ship.'3 3 Even where the illegitimate child lives with the parents, a wrong-
ful life action should not be precluded by parental immunity because
the omission to marry which causes the child damage is clearly not within
the scope of parental duty and authority.'
III. CONCLUSION
Despite its apparent uniqueness, the bastard's complaint has great
merit. The damages sustained as a result of illegitimacy are of a nature
akin to those compensable in existing causes of action, and the interests
protected bear a resemblance to those protected by the common law. The
cause of action is reasonably analogous to circumstances in which the
law imposes a duty of care. Additionally, the cause of action easily can
be distinguished from those undesirable claims to which courts have
objected.
The most incisive objections to recognition of the cause of action
are based upon public policy and the historical judicial reluctance to
impose a duty where nonfeasance is concerned. These objections, however,
do not necessarily compel the conclusion that legislative action 3 ' alone
would permit courts to recognize the claim. Without great deviation from
precedent, courts could let the bastard recover.
133. Even where the father does provide support voluntarily or through statutory pro-
ceedings there does not seem to be a family relationship sufficient to justify parental immu-
nity. In such circumstances only a portion of the relationship of a normal family exists. The
relationship should at least include the custody and control of the child, and the right of
parental discipline which requires a discretion which courts might choose to respect.
134. Were the tortious act to be the act of intercourse, it could be argued that the bene-
fit bestowed constitutes the willful tort exception to the immunity rule in reverse, and
that therefore the immunity rule should be applied.
135. A natural place for amendment of the Florida statutes in order to allow this
cause of action would be in the bastardy chapter. See FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (1967). At the
same time, if desired, a limit on recoverable damages could be set. One major problem is
that presently a paternity suit can be instituted only by "unmarried mothers." See FLA.
ATr'Y GEN. OP. 717 (1952). At least to the extent of allowing recovery for damages, the
statute would have to be amended to allow the child or someone on his behalf to institute
the proceedings to the extent of recovery for wrongful life damages.
